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| My week in a picture, compliments of Gidon (Florida). |
For now, let me start with the last Shabbat I had off base. As I mentioned last time, we were kept later on base on Friday because there was the possibility that we would have to be on call if we were needed to guard somewhere in the country following the attacks in Eilat. In truth, we all just wanted to go home. But the situation is becoming more real with the realization that our training does have a purpose, that it isn't all punishment and hell.
I stopped in Tel Aviv to pick up some clothes from my cousin's place and then took a bus to Jerusalem, where I spent Shabbat with Shmuel (New York) and Effy (Australia) in their apartment. We also met up with other friends in Tzanchanim, including Shmaya (New York) and Eliyahu (New Jersey). Most of these guys are Chabad, an outreach organization based in Brooklyn, that sends people all over the world to connect with Jews in different countries. Bottom line, though, is that Saturday reminded me of Unofficial, a very holy holiday at the University of Illinois where students wake up very early, don green outfits, and proceed to drink all day in honor of it being unofficially St. Patrick's Day. It was a great Shabbat with the boys.
Then I received a call Saturday evening from my commander, telling me that instead of going to Machanah Natan in Beersheva the following morning, my unit was to meet in the Tel Aviv central bus station. And it wasn't just my unit; there were hundreds, if not thousands, of soldiers packed into the lowest level of the building, convening for the week(s) ahead, then getting on buses to head off to our bases. Why did we meet here? Because rockets were falling on Beersheva and the surrounding area. I suppose the IDF thought, wisely, that it wasn't exactly safe for most of its southern-based combat forces to convene in an open area so close to where missiles from Gaza were striking. Thank you Hamas.
We had another surprise that Sunday: riot training. Never a part of basic or advanced training, I hear that all of Tzanchanim (both those in training and operational) took a day to learn how to deal with a riot. It was a chill day. We learned the thinking behind how to confront, oppose and contain a riot; the different, non-lethal weapons that are used to scare and intimidate rioters; the equipment soldiers wear if they are on the front lines against the rioters; and we even had a mock drill. One machlekah (platoon) pretended to be a crazed group of Palestinian supporters advancing down a hill while the other two machlekot, in full military gear, advanced to confront them. Even though this was a drill, and my Jewish friends were the ones waving the Palestinian flag and shouting all sorts of things (mainly in Hebrew), it was still quite an unnerving sight to see. You can watch videos of riots or large groups of people demonstrating, but let me tell you: it can be frightening. The amount of energy that is contained in a large group of people is nothing less than explosive, and the smallest, tiniest, most seemingly insignificant trigger can set the whole situation on fire. I now empathize tremendously with the IDF and police forces who faced down groups of rock-throwing Palestinians during the two intifadahs.
My day was marred by the stupidest of things: I slipped on some unsteady concrete, fell and cut my knee open. (I think this story is getting old.) I went back to base a little earlier than the rest of my friends and was told by the doctor that I was unfit to go into the shetach (field) for the hardest week of our training: Machlekah Mitkadem, Advanced Platoon. While it is certainly preferable to stay at the base instead of going for a week in the shetach, my friends were all going while I wasn't and I was to miss out on the experience and sense of accomplishment that comes with each hard week that passes. Every day I went to a medic to have him check my knee to see if it was ok to go down to the shetach. Finally on Wednesday, I received permission and was driven out that evening.
Woke up early with my unit and we had a TarPal, a Targile Plugah, company drill. This was another thing to make us more combat-ready at an earlier stage in our training. Supposedly, once you do a TarPal, you're considered a warrior and can engage in combat. And after a week of not sleeping much, walking a lot, and eating a little, it was a hard morning for my friends. And also for me. As the Magist, I sat back on a hill and provided covering fire to the successive hill that we were to attack. As my company advanced further up the hill, I had to pack up, run down my hill, across the field to the next, and up, up, up past the most advanced units. All with over 40% body weight between the Mag itself and all its ammo. It was hard.
But that was the extent of my week in the field. Or so I thought. The day before, a few guys had come back from the shetach and I joined them to learn about our new positions in an attack: provide covering fire from the rear. Thursday evening, this new citah (squad) went back into the shetach for the evening to practice demolishing a hill. It was fun to shoot the Mag at a distance of 300-400 meters, to set the gun up on the stand and get into place in less than three minutes. My partner, Michael, and I have great chemistry and can set up, take down, aim and fire the weapon with great fluidity that we make a great pair. I watched the other Magist and his partner shout with each other and become frustrated; made me thankful to have a partner like mine. Although he's a small guy (my previous Mag partner got moved to a heavier weapon), Michael is strong and can carry a lot of weight. He's one of my best friends in the military and his English makes it easier to communicate with me, although we still focus on doing everything in Hebrew.
Anyway, the citah also includes other, heavier weapons, such as an automatic grenade launcher, mortar and .50 caliber Browning. It's a relatively easy citah to be a part of, and fun to boot. After we were done, we hiked the four or five kilometers back to base. Now, I happen to be the only lone soldier in this citah. My Hebrew isn't the best, but, as Shmaya observes, he's impressed that I'm not afraid or hesitant to flex my linguistic muscles. I'll speak in front of large groups of people; I'll try to express myself without feeling insecure about my Hebrew level, etc. It is with this that the Sammal (Sergeant), usually the guy who kicks our ass with discipline, would turn to me with a huge, laughing smile on his face and ask me to give a word or two of inspiration to the group. I had extended myself earlier in the evening by shouting and expressing a lot of "rabak," or spirit/craziness. He loved this crazy American, while a child at speaking Hebrew, is nuts and crazed when it comes to fighting. Now everyone in the plugah knows about that evening when I shouted random things during our hike back.
Shabbat was chill, with no guard or kitchen duty to perform. And the next week turned out to be one of the fastest in the army.
Kliah Mitkadem, Advanced Shooting, was a week spent all day on the firing range. I turned in my Mag for the M16 for the week. We practiced shooting in all three positions (prone, kneeling, standing), and learned some new ones. We fired using tables and benches. We fired during the day and at night. From twenty-five meters to two hundred meters. With jammed magazines and without. Shooting on command at an assigned target at the shout of a number. Running two hundred meters, crawling ten, then running the rest of the way and shooting at a target in less than three minutes. Against stationary and moving targets.
Yes, moving targets, Israeli-style. At the two-hundred meter line on some of the ranges is a concrete walkway, fifteen feet below ground-level that is accessible by ladder. We staple the cardboard targets onto two wooden sticks tied together, and then we manually raise and lower them, run from the left to the right. It is, honestly, a ridiculous scene. And the walls of the trench are graffitied with all sorts of sayings, most in Hebrew, but also some in English. I made my contribution: "Welcome to Tzahal, paid for by American taxpayer dollars." If you see "DF, March '11," holla'!
This was a great week to improve our shooting. I hadn't shot consistently and often with the M16 since becoming a Magist. I had to have fired well over two hundred bullets each day, Sunday to Wednesday. But the week was tiring. Not hard, but exhausting. Constantly running from the firing line out to the targets and back, to check how I shot, to set up targets, to take them down, constantly on the firing ranges, eating military rations, except for lunch where we went back to base, waking up early and getting to bed late. But the week went by fast.
And the last evening, I was able to shoot a Micro Tavor! It's the new Israeli-made gun of the IDF. The Tavor has been used by Golani, Givati, and most recently Nahal. The Micro Tavor is a tiny version of the standard Tavor. It's gradually being introduced to all the combat units; the M16 and M4 are being phased out. So the last evening, our shooting instructor let us shoot her Micro Tavor. What's the difference? Mainly it's a different style of gun, where the magazine is behind the trigger, as opposed to in front of it. This condenses the entire weapon and also brings the weight and center of gravity closer to your shoulder, which makes it easier to maneuver. (It's like a device I used when I was younger to train for baseball. I attached a weight to the end of the handle that would bring my hands in closer to my body and force the barrel of the bat through the hitting zone in a more direct path to making contact with the ball. When I took the weight off, my hands were quick to the baseball and the barrel exploded through the zone.) The one immediate drawback to this weapon design is that the stock/butt of the gun is non-adjustable.
On Thursday I was given a day to finally get new shoe-inserts for my somewhat-flat feet. I got back that evening during the middle of our free hour at night. We went to bed early because we woke up at 3:30 the next morning to go to the paratrooping base! Near Rehovot, I will be at this base for the next two weeks; this week learning how to jump and the following week jumping out of a plane five times! I'm psyched, excited, nervous, and pumped all at once. And this weekend I'm staying in Tel Aviv with David and Amy and the kids, who just got back from a few months in the States.
If everything goes according to the schedule, I have a month and a half left in my training. My masa kumta is October 17th. But there is the potential for things to change. It's been a while since I flexed my political muscles. What follows is my take on the politics of the region. My account of my army experience is over for this post. The rest is my analysis as a political science major on the different storms that have gathered in and around Israel. If you're interested, please read on. I've tried to keep things simple and not sound academic. Enjoy!
(Please note that all of the information is what I have gathered over the past few weeks reading news articles on my Blackberry from base. I don't have citations [it's not exactly a college paper] or quotes. The facts are, to the best of my intentions and ability, accurate and the analysis is a combination of mine and others. But I have neither the time nor will to properly cite everything. This is as much an exercise for me to fulfill my enjoyment of talking politics as it is to help explain what is going on and also to look back in a few years and understand what was developing at this point. Disclaimer over.)
The attacks in Eilat the other week indicate a number of things. First off, while the Palestinian Resistance Committees (PRC) claims responsibility, they could not have acted in violence against Israel without the consent of Hamas. For one thing, the terrorists originated from the Gaza Strip, went through the vast Sinai Peninsula, and crossed Israel's permeable border with Egypt to attack and kill civilians. Hamas claims to govern Gaza and is consequently held responsible for everything that happens in its territory. (If, for example, they had no knowledge of PRC's intentions, then that raises a whole other set of questions about who is in fact in charge of Gaza.) The Israeli Air Force attacked military and PRC targets in response. Hamas asked for a cease-fire, which was respected for all of a few hours until rockets began again to rain down on southern Israel. Although the casualty numbers are very minimal (thanks in part to the primitive technology of the rockets and the surprising and welcome effectiveness of Israel's new defense technology, Iron Dome), hospitals are reporting a significant increase in the amount of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) cases. The most damaging effect of these rockets is psychological.
But I want to go back to the larger picture. Hamas is likely giving tacit consent to attack Israel because of what I can only think to describe as the build-up over the past half year of a political hurricane or vortex. Currently, there are many forces within Israel and the Palestinian territories, as well as the Arab world, that are gaining momentum and force. Unless you've been living under a rock since the beginning of the year (or in the Israeli army), you're more than aware of the "Arab Spring." Leaders have been overthrown and regimes threatened in Tunisia, Egypt and most recently Libya. The Gulf states have also not been spared. In Syria, a blood bath continues to unfold as Bashar Assad has clearly made it his intent to kill every Syrian before relinquishing power.
The Arab Spring has been a reversal of what engulfed the Arab world in the 1960s and 70s. The rise of the Mubarak (Egypt), Qaddafi (Libya) and Assad regimes represented the desire for pan-Arabism to be the dominant force across the region; an ideal that the societies strewn across the states could unify behind an Arab identity. Needless to say, these were secular forces. Today, the march of militant Islam (perhaps beginning with the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran) has turned into a sprint.
For years, Mubarak was the strongest force in the Arab world for the US against radical religious elements coming to power. Although his regime still remains in place via the military, it is threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda, and even Hamas. Among the Palestinians, Hamas represents this militant Islam. Fatah (the governing power in the West Bank) represents the more secularly-inclined brand of Arab politics. Fatah is the old and Hamas is the new. In the current whirlwind of the region, Hamas is much more likely to curry favor than Fatah, especially since Fatah has shown an inclination (and history) of relative willingness to negotiate with Israel.
And that is something that should not be understated: no matter the differences across the Arab world, the constant unifying factor is animosity and hatred of Israel. It is an interesting "rally 'round the flag" effect. This term refers to the idea that a nation comes together when faced with an external threat; remember how everyone was suddenly so patriotic after 9/11? In the Middle East, conflict with Israel is to be supported no matter who is doing the fighting. If you're an Arab and against any conflict with the Jewish state, then surely you are for the Jews and against the Arabs. Consequently, on the flip side, if you negotiate with Israel, who's to say you're not in bed with them or, God forbid, the US and the West? Negotiation is paramount to treason. And especially if negotiations continue to fail (as they have between Fatah and Israel), then the legitimacy of the call for peaceful talks weakens and people begin to turn to more radical elements who offer a solution. Fatah recognizes this and, after years of a blood-stained rivalry, signed a unity agreement with Hamas. Hamas is the vanguard, Fatah is the old guard.
What, then, is all the hype about September 20th? It is the date of the opening session of the UN. Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestinian Authority (essentially, Fatah), has created a stir for the better part of a year from when he first announced his intention to go the the General Assembly or the Security Council (no one is exactly sure which one) and have that body vote in favor of the creation of a Palestinian state. If he goes to the GA, he will have the votes. If he goes to the SC, he will not, as the US is expected (hoped [we really never know with the dynamic duo of Obama and Susan Rice, the US envoy to the UN]) to exercise its veto.
So let's say that by September 21st, the UN has in fact granted the Palestinians a state. What does that mean? In reality, absolutely nothing. For one thing, sometime in the 1980s a similar resolution was brought to the UN, and I believed it passed. To my knowledge, the resolution that Abbas is intending to bring to the UN is just for the organization to recognize the Palestinians as a state, but will not actually declare the creation of one, like they did with Kosovo in 2008. In fact, I've read at different points throughout the spring and summer that this entire UN-ploy was initially a diplomatic maneuver by Abbas to strong-arm Israel and cajole the US into negotiations once again. Abbas, I've read, really wants to climb down from the tree he finds himself in. At this point, however, it is too late. There is too much hype and expectation, and if he backs down, then he is lost for sure. What do I mean by lost? While the "situation on the ground" will not change come Sept. 21st, the politics within the Palestinian leadership certainly will. If the UN does support Abbas, then his leadership is buoyed and renewed and we'll see where it goes from there. If the UN does not support Abbas, then he is almost certainly finished as the leader of the Palestinians.
Which is now why the unity agreement with Hamas is so critical. Who will fill the leadership void? Well, the people will see Fatah going to the UN and failing. So now they seek a solution in different channels. And that is Hamas. And that is the PRC. And that is the Eilat attack. Hamas knows it is in a relative position of power because Mubarak has fallen, the Rafah crossing into Egypt is open, radical elements akin to its own agenda are rising and threatening the powers that be across the region. If Abbas fails, it is perfectly timed with a Hamas that, after a few years of quiet following Operation Caste Lead, has again begun to attack Israel as it claims to speak for the Palestinians.
Shifting our focus to Israel's northern borders, with Lebanon and Syria, a much more uncertain reality could unfold. Hezbollah gained a huge victory in its 2006 war with Israel. It didn't necessarily win the war, but by standing up to the IDF and withstanding three weeks of combat, it came out the victor certainly in the eyes of the Arab world, as well as others internationally, including many Israelis. As the primary conduit between Iran and Hezbollah, Syria is seen as the only nation supporting effective resistance against Israel vis a vis Hezbollah. Assad could push Hezbollah to war with Israel to ease pressure off his regime, much like the marches on the borders a few months ago were as much about reclaiming the Golan Heights and remembering the "Naksa" as they were to distract from domestic turmoil. If Assad falls, Iran loses its most important asset and the ability to transfer arms and equipment to Hezbollah. Tehran could push Damascus who in turn would push Hezbollah to begin firing rockets into the Galilee in northern Israel, test Jerusalem's resolve, and possibly initiate a conflict. In the eyes of Assad and the Arab world, any of the Syrian demonstrators who continue to assemble against his regime while he is engaged in conflict with Israel via Hezbollah are traitors.
A combined escalation in tension between Hamas and Israel and Hezbollah and Israel would also put great pressure on the secular, military-led regime in Cairo. The peace with Israel since 1979 would be in jeopardy. Israel has enjoyed an unprecedented thirty years of peace with the most powerful Arab state. But that peace was maintained because of Mubarak and his regime. It was conditional on many things, including a demilitarized Sinai peninsula and assurance of US qualitative military aid equal to what Israel received. The Egyptian population, meanwhile, was and still is very anti-Israel and anti-Semitic. The demonstrations that led to Mubarak stepping down had a lot to do with them seeing their leader as in bed with the West and stepping on his own country's values, mainly Islam. Two weeks before the Eilat attacks, Cairo asked for and Jerusalem granted permission for 1,000 Egyptian soldiers to patrol the Sinai as intel of increased terrorist activity between the Palestinians and the Beduins threatened to escalate into an imminent attack (as it eventually did). But what were 1,000 soldiers to do in an area over 60,000 square kilometers? It is a drop in the ocean.
While I believe a military presence is now certainly needed in the Sinai (although Egyptian soldiers may not be the best, as there are countless accounts of them using refugees from Africa as target practice), it is a tricky balance because it could lead to the slow chipping away of the once stable peace and security enjoyed between the Egypt and Israel. And that is what Hamas wants and needs. In order for them to truly flex their muscles, they need to operate from a position of security, and what is more secure if they have the full support of Cairo? As the only Arab political body currently engaged in conflict with Israel, Hamas can become the leader and example of what all Arab bodies should be doing. The generals in Cairo are soon to be in a very difficult position: how can they resist their population's growing resentment and anger of their power without cracking down hard on the population, especially following the relatively peaceful rebellion that toppled Mubarak and now that Assad has soured the international community's view of Arab leaders tactics in the face of demonstrations, all without losing valuable US foreign aid? Withstanding these forces will be difficult, to say the least.
Quickly, I am reminded of a political cartoon from my AP European history class my senior year in high school. It depicted Martin Luther at the top of a dam. On the dam was written "the Church" (or something to that effect) and the water above the dam was filled with words such as social, religious, economic, and so on. The dam has a slight crack in it and Luther tosses a small stone in the air. The idea is that it was his 95 Theses that he posted on a wall in a German city in 1517 that released all these forces. To apply it here, Hamas is Luther, the waters are the Egyptian people, and the dam is the military government in Cairo.
Now is the importance September 20th a little clearer? Given a vote in affirmation or negation of a Palestinian state, I believe there could be, to put it modestly, unrest. In this part of the world, that means an "intifadah," the Arabic word for "uprising." As history demonstrates, the Palestinian people (whether justified or not) are prone to violence. The first intifadah in the late 1980s attests to this. The second intifadah in 2000 does as well. What's more is that Yassir Arafat (quick story: Arafat calls Bill Clinton a few days before the end of his presidency to congratulate him on the past eight years. Clinton responds, "if it weren't for you, we would have peace between Israel and the Palestinians.") instigated this second round violence. (It was not, as is widely believed, Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount. Arafat admitted in an interview at some point that he had planned the intifadah in advance; the visit was just the justification.) Already, Abbas announced his intention to hold rallies throughout September in different Palestinian cities. He wants them to be peaceful and away from Israeli settlers and Israel-proper. As Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hamas, has said, "we love death as much as the Jews love life." With sentiment like that, how can anyone possibly hope for peaceful rallies and for this month not to spiral into a new intifadah or some new round of violence? On September 21st, the Palestinians will feel either snubbed or legitimized by the UN, and they may expect the instantaneous creation of a state, and when that fails to materialize, they will channel their anger and frustration into their favorite past-time: throwing rocks.
We had another surprise that Sunday: riot training. Never a part of basic or advanced training, I hear that all of Tzanchanim (both those in training and operational) took a day to learn how to deal with a riot. It was a chill day. We learned the thinking behind how to confront, oppose and contain a riot; the different, non-lethal weapons that are used to scare and intimidate rioters; the equipment soldiers wear if they are on the front lines against the rioters; and we even had a mock drill. One machlekah (platoon) pretended to be a crazed group of Palestinian supporters advancing down a hill while the other two machlekot, in full military gear, advanced to confront them. Even though this was a drill, and my Jewish friends were the ones waving the Palestinian flag and shouting all sorts of things (mainly in Hebrew), it was still quite an unnerving sight to see. You can watch videos of riots or large groups of people demonstrating, but let me tell you: it can be frightening. The amount of energy that is contained in a large group of people is nothing less than explosive, and the smallest, tiniest, most seemingly insignificant trigger can set the whole situation on fire. I now empathize tremendously with the IDF and police forces who faced down groups of rock-throwing Palestinians during the two intifadahs.
My day was marred by the stupidest of things: I slipped on some unsteady concrete, fell and cut my knee open. (I think this story is getting old.) I went back to base a little earlier than the rest of my friends and was told by the doctor that I was unfit to go into the shetach (field) for the hardest week of our training: Machlekah Mitkadem, Advanced Platoon. While it is certainly preferable to stay at the base instead of going for a week in the shetach, my friends were all going while I wasn't and I was to miss out on the experience and sense of accomplishment that comes with each hard week that passes. Every day I went to a medic to have him check my knee to see if it was ok to go down to the shetach. Finally on Wednesday, I received permission and was driven out that evening.
Woke up early with my unit and we had a TarPal, a Targile Plugah, company drill. This was another thing to make us more combat-ready at an earlier stage in our training. Supposedly, once you do a TarPal, you're considered a warrior and can engage in combat. And after a week of not sleeping much, walking a lot, and eating a little, it was a hard morning for my friends. And also for me. As the Magist, I sat back on a hill and provided covering fire to the successive hill that we were to attack. As my company advanced further up the hill, I had to pack up, run down my hill, across the field to the next, and up, up, up past the most advanced units. All with over 40% body weight between the Mag itself and all its ammo. It was hard.
But that was the extent of my week in the field. Or so I thought. The day before, a few guys had come back from the shetach and I joined them to learn about our new positions in an attack: provide covering fire from the rear. Thursday evening, this new citah (squad) went back into the shetach for the evening to practice demolishing a hill. It was fun to shoot the Mag at a distance of 300-400 meters, to set the gun up on the stand and get into place in less than three minutes. My partner, Michael, and I have great chemistry and can set up, take down, aim and fire the weapon with great fluidity that we make a great pair. I watched the other Magist and his partner shout with each other and become frustrated; made me thankful to have a partner like mine. Although he's a small guy (my previous Mag partner got moved to a heavier weapon), Michael is strong and can carry a lot of weight. He's one of my best friends in the military and his English makes it easier to communicate with me, although we still focus on doing everything in Hebrew.
Anyway, the citah also includes other, heavier weapons, such as an automatic grenade launcher, mortar and .50 caliber Browning. It's a relatively easy citah to be a part of, and fun to boot. After we were done, we hiked the four or five kilometers back to base. Now, I happen to be the only lone soldier in this citah. My Hebrew isn't the best, but, as Shmaya observes, he's impressed that I'm not afraid or hesitant to flex my linguistic muscles. I'll speak in front of large groups of people; I'll try to express myself without feeling insecure about my Hebrew level, etc. It is with this that the Sammal (Sergeant), usually the guy who kicks our ass with discipline, would turn to me with a huge, laughing smile on his face and ask me to give a word or two of inspiration to the group. I had extended myself earlier in the evening by shouting and expressing a lot of "rabak," or spirit/craziness. He loved this crazy American, while a child at speaking Hebrew, is nuts and crazed when it comes to fighting. Now everyone in the plugah knows about that evening when I shouted random things during our hike back.
Shabbat was chill, with no guard or kitchen duty to perform. And the next week turned out to be one of the fastest in the army.
Kliah Mitkadem, Advanced Shooting, was a week spent all day on the firing range. I turned in my Mag for the M16 for the week. We practiced shooting in all three positions (prone, kneeling, standing), and learned some new ones. We fired using tables and benches. We fired during the day and at night. From twenty-five meters to two hundred meters. With jammed magazines and without. Shooting on command at an assigned target at the shout of a number. Running two hundred meters, crawling ten, then running the rest of the way and shooting at a target in less than three minutes. Against stationary and moving targets.
Yes, moving targets, Israeli-style. At the two-hundred meter line on some of the ranges is a concrete walkway, fifteen feet below ground-level that is accessible by ladder. We staple the cardboard targets onto two wooden sticks tied together, and then we manually raise and lower them, run from the left to the right. It is, honestly, a ridiculous scene. And the walls of the trench are graffitied with all sorts of sayings, most in Hebrew, but also some in English. I made my contribution: "Welcome to Tzahal, paid for by American taxpayer dollars." If you see "DF, March '11," holla'!
This was a great week to improve our shooting. I hadn't shot consistently and often with the M16 since becoming a Magist. I had to have fired well over two hundred bullets each day, Sunday to Wednesday. But the week was tiring. Not hard, but exhausting. Constantly running from the firing line out to the targets and back, to check how I shot, to set up targets, to take them down, constantly on the firing ranges, eating military rations, except for lunch where we went back to base, waking up early and getting to bed late. But the week went by fast.
And the last evening, I was able to shoot a Micro Tavor! It's the new Israeli-made gun of the IDF. The Tavor has been used by Golani, Givati, and most recently Nahal. The Micro Tavor is a tiny version of the standard Tavor. It's gradually being introduced to all the combat units; the M16 and M4 are being phased out. So the last evening, our shooting instructor let us shoot her Micro Tavor. What's the difference? Mainly it's a different style of gun, where the magazine is behind the trigger, as opposed to in front of it. This condenses the entire weapon and also brings the weight and center of gravity closer to your shoulder, which makes it easier to maneuver. (It's like a device I used when I was younger to train for baseball. I attached a weight to the end of the handle that would bring my hands in closer to my body and force the barrel of the bat through the hitting zone in a more direct path to making contact with the ball. When I took the weight off, my hands were quick to the baseball and the barrel exploded through the zone.) The one immediate drawback to this weapon design is that the stock/butt of the gun is non-adjustable.
On Thursday I was given a day to finally get new shoe-inserts for my somewhat-flat feet. I got back that evening during the middle of our free hour at night. We went to bed early because we woke up at 3:30 the next morning to go to the paratrooping base! Near Rehovot, I will be at this base for the next two weeks; this week learning how to jump and the following week jumping out of a plane five times! I'm psyched, excited, nervous, and pumped all at once. And this weekend I'm staying in Tel Aviv with David and Amy and the kids, who just got back from a few months in the States.
If everything goes according to the schedule, I have a month and a half left in my training. My masa kumta is October 17th. But there is the potential for things to change. It's been a while since I flexed my political muscles. What follows is my take on the politics of the region. My account of my army experience is over for this post. The rest is my analysis as a political science major on the different storms that have gathered in and around Israel. If you're interested, please read on. I've tried to keep things simple and not sound academic. Enjoy!
(Please note that all of the information is what I have gathered over the past few weeks reading news articles on my Blackberry from base. I don't have citations [it's not exactly a college paper] or quotes. The facts are, to the best of my intentions and ability, accurate and the analysis is a combination of mine and others. But I have neither the time nor will to properly cite everything. This is as much an exercise for me to fulfill my enjoyment of talking politics as it is to help explain what is going on and also to look back in a few years and understand what was developing at this point. Disclaimer over.)
The attacks in Eilat the other week indicate a number of things. First off, while the Palestinian Resistance Committees (PRC) claims responsibility, they could not have acted in violence against Israel without the consent of Hamas. For one thing, the terrorists originated from the Gaza Strip, went through the vast Sinai Peninsula, and crossed Israel's permeable border with Egypt to attack and kill civilians. Hamas claims to govern Gaza and is consequently held responsible for everything that happens in its territory. (If, for example, they had no knowledge of PRC's intentions, then that raises a whole other set of questions about who is in fact in charge of Gaza.) The Israeli Air Force attacked military and PRC targets in response. Hamas asked for a cease-fire, which was respected for all of a few hours until rockets began again to rain down on southern Israel. Although the casualty numbers are very minimal (thanks in part to the primitive technology of the rockets and the surprising and welcome effectiveness of Israel's new defense technology, Iron Dome), hospitals are reporting a significant increase in the amount of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) cases. The most damaging effect of these rockets is psychological.
But I want to go back to the larger picture. Hamas is likely giving tacit consent to attack Israel because of what I can only think to describe as the build-up over the past half year of a political hurricane or vortex. Currently, there are many forces within Israel and the Palestinian territories, as well as the Arab world, that are gaining momentum and force. Unless you've been living under a rock since the beginning of the year (or in the Israeli army), you're more than aware of the "Arab Spring." Leaders have been overthrown and regimes threatened in Tunisia, Egypt and most recently Libya. The Gulf states have also not been spared. In Syria, a blood bath continues to unfold as Bashar Assad has clearly made it his intent to kill every Syrian before relinquishing power.
The Arab Spring has been a reversal of what engulfed the Arab world in the 1960s and 70s. The rise of the Mubarak (Egypt), Qaddafi (Libya) and Assad regimes represented the desire for pan-Arabism to be the dominant force across the region; an ideal that the societies strewn across the states could unify behind an Arab identity. Needless to say, these were secular forces. Today, the march of militant Islam (perhaps beginning with the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran) has turned into a sprint.
For years, Mubarak was the strongest force in the Arab world for the US against radical religious elements coming to power. Although his regime still remains in place via the military, it is threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda, and even Hamas. Among the Palestinians, Hamas represents this militant Islam. Fatah (the governing power in the West Bank) represents the more secularly-inclined brand of Arab politics. Fatah is the old and Hamas is the new. In the current whirlwind of the region, Hamas is much more likely to curry favor than Fatah, especially since Fatah has shown an inclination (and history) of relative willingness to negotiate with Israel.
And that is something that should not be understated: no matter the differences across the Arab world, the constant unifying factor is animosity and hatred of Israel. It is an interesting "rally 'round the flag" effect. This term refers to the idea that a nation comes together when faced with an external threat; remember how everyone was suddenly so patriotic after 9/11? In the Middle East, conflict with Israel is to be supported no matter who is doing the fighting. If you're an Arab and against any conflict with the Jewish state, then surely you are for the Jews and against the Arabs. Consequently, on the flip side, if you negotiate with Israel, who's to say you're not in bed with them or, God forbid, the US and the West? Negotiation is paramount to treason. And especially if negotiations continue to fail (as they have between Fatah and Israel), then the legitimacy of the call for peaceful talks weakens and people begin to turn to more radical elements who offer a solution. Fatah recognizes this and, after years of a blood-stained rivalry, signed a unity agreement with Hamas. Hamas is the vanguard, Fatah is the old guard.
What, then, is all the hype about September 20th? It is the date of the opening session of the UN. Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestinian Authority (essentially, Fatah), has created a stir for the better part of a year from when he first announced his intention to go the the General Assembly or the Security Council (no one is exactly sure which one) and have that body vote in favor of the creation of a Palestinian state. If he goes to the GA, he will have the votes. If he goes to the SC, he will not, as the US is expected (hoped [we really never know with the dynamic duo of Obama and Susan Rice, the US envoy to the UN]) to exercise its veto.
So let's say that by September 21st, the UN has in fact granted the Palestinians a state. What does that mean? In reality, absolutely nothing. For one thing, sometime in the 1980s a similar resolution was brought to the UN, and I believed it passed. To my knowledge, the resolution that Abbas is intending to bring to the UN is just for the organization to recognize the Palestinians as a state, but will not actually declare the creation of one, like they did with Kosovo in 2008. In fact, I've read at different points throughout the spring and summer that this entire UN-ploy was initially a diplomatic maneuver by Abbas to strong-arm Israel and cajole the US into negotiations once again. Abbas, I've read, really wants to climb down from the tree he finds himself in. At this point, however, it is too late. There is too much hype and expectation, and if he backs down, then he is lost for sure. What do I mean by lost? While the "situation on the ground" will not change come Sept. 21st, the politics within the Palestinian leadership certainly will. If the UN does support Abbas, then his leadership is buoyed and renewed and we'll see where it goes from there. If the UN does not support Abbas, then he is almost certainly finished as the leader of the Palestinians.
Which is now why the unity agreement with Hamas is so critical. Who will fill the leadership void? Well, the people will see Fatah going to the UN and failing. So now they seek a solution in different channels. And that is Hamas. And that is the PRC. And that is the Eilat attack. Hamas knows it is in a relative position of power because Mubarak has fallen, the Rafah crossing into Egypt is open, radical elements akin to its own agenda are rising and threatening the powers that be across the region. If Abbas fails, it is perfectly timed with a Hamas that, after a few years of quiet following Operation Caste Lead, has again begun to attack Israel as it claims to speak for the Palestinians.
Shifting our focus to Israel's northern borders, with Lebanon and Syria, a much more uncertain reality could unfold. Hezbollah gained a huge victory in its 2006 war with Israel. It didn't necessarily win the war, but by standing up to the IDF and withstanding three weeks of combat, it came out the victor certainly in the eyes of the Arab world, as well as others internationally, including many Israelis. As the primary conduit between Iran and Hezbollah, Syria is seen as the only nation supporting effective resistance against Israel vis a vis Hezbollah. Assad could push Hezbollah to war with Israel to ease pressure off his regime, much like the marches on the borders a few months ago were as much about reclaiming the Golan Heights and remembering the "Naksa" as they were to distract from domestic turmoil. If Assad falls, Iran loses its most important asset and the ability to transfer arms and equipment to Hezbollah. Tehran could push Damascus who in turn would push Hezbollah to begin firing rockets into the Galilee in northern Israel, test Jerusalem's resolve, and possibly initiate a conflict. In the eyes of Assad and the Arab world, any of the Syrian demonstrators who continue to assemble against his regime while he is engaged in conflict with Israel via Hezbollah are traitors.
A combined escalation in tension between Hamas and Israel and Hezbollah and Israel would also put great pressure on the secular, military-led regime in Cairo. The peace with Israel since 1979 would be in jeopardy. Israel has enjoyed an unprecedented thirty years of peace with the most powerful Arab state. But that peace was maintained because of Mubarak and his regime. It was conditional on many things, including a demilitarized Sinai peninsula and assurance of US qualitative military aid equal to what Israel received. The Egyptian population, meanwhile, was and still is very anti-Israel and anti-Semitic. The demonstrations that led to Mubarak stepping down had a lot to do with them seeing their leader as in bed with the West and stepping on his own country's values, mainly Islam. Two weeks before the Eilat attacks, Cairo asked for and Jerusalem granted permission for 1,000 Egyptian soldiers to patrol the Sinai as intel of increased terrorist activity between the Palestinians and the Beduins threatened to escalate into an imminent attack (as it eventually did). But what were 1,000 soldiers to do in an area over 60,000 square kilometers? It is a drop in the ocean.
While I believe a military presence is now certainly needed in the Sinai (although Egyptian soldiers may not be the best, as there are countless accounts of them using refugees from Africa as target practice), it is a tricky balance because it could lead to the slow chipping away of the once stable peace and security enjoyed between the Egypt and Israel. And that is what Hamas wants and needs. In order for them to truly flex their muscles, they need to operate from a position of security, and what is more secure if they have the full support of Cairo? As the only Arab political body currently engaged in conflict with Israel, Hamas can become the leader and example of what all Arab bodies should be doing. The generals in Cairo are soon to be in a very difficult position: how can they resist their population's growing resentment and anger of their power without cracking down hard on the population, especially following the relatively peaceful rebellion that toppled Mubarak and now that Assad has soured the international community's view of Arab leaders tactics in the face of demonstrations, all without losing valuable US foreign aid? Withstanding these forces will be difficult, to say the least.
Quickly, I am reminded of a political cartoon from my AP European history class my senior year in high school. It depicted Martin Luther at the top of a dam. On the dam was written "the Church" (or something to that effect) and the water above the dam was filled with words such as social, religious, economic, and so on. The dam has a slight crack in it and Luther tosses a small stone in the air. The idea is that it was his 95 Theses that he posted on a wall in a German city in 1517 that released all these forces. To apply it here, Hamas is Luther, the waters are the Egyptian people, and the dam is the military government in Cairo.
Now is the importance September 20th a little clearer? Given a vote in affirmation or negation of a Palestinian state, I believe there could be, to put it modestly, unrest. In this part of the world, that means an "intifadah," the Arabic word for "uprising." As history demonstrates, the Palestinian people (whether justified or not) are prone to violence. The first intifadah in the late 1980s attests to this. The second intifadah in 2000 does as well. What's more is that Yassir Arafat (quick story: Arafat calls Bill Clinton a few days before the end of his presidency to congratulate him on the past eight years. Clinton responds, "if it weren't for you, we would have peace between Israel and the Palestinians.") instigated this second round violence. (It was not, as is widely believed, Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount. Arafat admitted in an interview at some point that he had planned the intifadah in advance; the visit was just the justification.) Already, Abbas announced his intention to hold rallies throughout September in different Palestinian cities. He wants them to be peaceful and away from Israeli settlers and Israel-proper. As Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hamas, has said, "we love death as much as the Jews love life." With sentiment like that, how can anyone possibly hope for peaceful rallies and for this month not to spiral into a new intifadah or some new round of violence? On September 21st, the Palestinians will feel either snubbed or legitimized by the UN, and they may expect the instantaneous creation of a state, and when that fails to materialize, they will channel their anger and frustration into their favorite past-time: throwing rocks.
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